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CUSTOMER RESTRICTIONS IN FAIR TRADE CONTRACTS
After a finished product has been sold to a distributor for a profit, its
manufacturer is usually not concerned about its subsequent progress through
the distribution system. In some circumstances, however, a manufacturer is
directly interested in the transactions which follow the sale to the distributor.
If a commodity is a prestige product the manufacturer may desire high retail
prices to maintain the exalted status of his product. Similarly he may desire
to keep his product from those retailers whose establishments are not asso-
ciated with the sale of high quality products.
To maintain high prices the manufacturer may require the wholesaler or
retailer (or both) to resell his product above certain prices. This practice
is called resale price maintenance. To prevent his product from reaching the
possession of undesirable retailers, the manufacturer may require that his
distributors sell only to retailers approved by the manufacturer. This limita-
tion on the distributor is called a vertical customer restriction.
Federal enabling legislation has been passed which allows states to legal-
ize resale price maintenance. 1 A large majority of the states have enacted fair
trade laws which permit manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers to enter into
contracts establishing minimum or fixed resale prices. 2 Despite this legislation,
a comprehensive fair trade system is not possible where retailers who have
not contracted to follow resale prices may obtain the products and sell them
at lower prices. Some states have solved this problem by incorporating in
their fair trade legislation non-signer clauses which allow the manufacturer
to establish retail prices at which all outlets must sell if the manufacturer
obtains an agreement with any retailer in the state. 3 In states without non-
signer legislation, however, the only means to eliminate retail sales below the
manufacturer's established prices is to prevent retailers who are not parties
to fair trade contracts from obtaining the goods. This result is usually accom-
1 The Miller-Tydings Amendment to the Sherman Act, 50 Stat. 693 (1937), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964), and the McGuire Act, 66 Stat. 631 (1952), as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964), amending the Federal Trade Commission Act.
These statutes permit only vertical price-fixing contracts. Vertical resale price main-
tenance contracts are contracts between persons who are on different levels of competition
and are not in competition with each other. Thus a contract between a manufacturer and
a wholesaler is a vertical resale price maintenance contract. A horizontal price-fixing con-
tract, a contract between persons who are on the same level of distribution and who are in
competition with each other, for example, a contract betwen two wholesalers, is illegal
under the Sherman Act.
2 Presently 42 states have fair trade laws. 2 Trade Reg. Rep, n 6017 (1967).
3 An example of a non-signer clause is § 56:4-6 of the New Jersey Fair Trade Law,
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:4-3 to -6 (1964):
Willfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale or selling any commodity
at less than the price stipulated in any contract entered into pursuant to the
provisions of section 56:4-5 of this Title !legalizing resale price maintenance
contractsl, whether the person so advertising, offering for sale or selling is or
is not a party to such contract, is unfair competition and is actionable at the suit
of the producer or distributor of such commodity or at the suit of any retailer
selling such commodity at not less than the price stipulated in any contract en-
tered into pursuant to the provisions of section 56:4-5 of this Title,
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plished by means of a customer restriction on the manufacturer's wholesalers,
which prohibits them from selling to non-contracting retailers.
The legality of customer restrictions imposed to implement a compre-
hensive fair trade program has long been assumed. 4
 However, in United States
v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. customer restrictions upon purchasing wholesalers
were declared illega1. 5 The effect of this decision upon the long standing as-
sumption of the legality of customer restrictions in fair trade programs will be
examined in this comment.
I. RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
The Sherman Antitrust Act declares that every contract, conspiracy or
combination in restraint of trade ambng the states is illega1. 8 Price fixing
establishing fixed or minimum resale prices was held to be illegal per se under
the Sherman Act because it was an unreasonable restraint of trade that was
lessening competition and constituting an impermissible restraint on alienation.'
This absolute prohibition of price fixing, regardless of the circumstances,
was considered by some to leave valuable rights unprotected. Resale price
maintenance was considered necessary to protect smaller merchants from the
competition of larger rivals, such as chain stores and discount houses, and to
protect some manufacturers whose products would suffer a loss of goodwill
or reputation if they were sold at low prices.
Because of their size, mass merchandisers, such as chain stores and
discount houses, have advantages over small merchants. They can sell prod-
ucts at lower prices than the small merchants and still receive a substantial
profit because of their high volume of sales. In addition, with the intention of
attracting more customers into the store, the mass merchandisers may ad-
vertise and sell some well known products at a loss without suffering any
economic injury. A product sold at a loss with the intention of attracting
customers into the store is called a "loss leader," 8 and any loss suffered from
the "loss leader" can be absorbed by the large retailers. They alone have a
large volume of sales of other products from which they can recoup the loss
caused by the "loss leader."
The advent of the chain stores and discount houses during the Depression
placed many small retailers in competition with the lower prices and "loss
leaders" of these mass merchandisers. 8 Because the small retailers feared that
the mass merchandisers would drive many of them out of business, they sup-
4 E.g., Vornado, Inc. v. Corning Glass Works, 388 F.2d (3d Cir. 1968), aff'g 255
F. Supp. 216 (D.N.J. 1966). The district court opinion concerning the issue of fair trading
and discrimination against certain stamp programs is noted in 8 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev.
376 (1967).
rc 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
6 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
7 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
8 Schachtman, Resale Price Maintenance and the Fair Trade Laws, 11 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
562, 577 (1950). Sales of a product below its costs, such as a "loss leader," may be illegal
in certain circumstances under § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964)
or under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1964) or under
a state statute dealing with sales below cost. E.g., N.J. Stat, Ann. § 56:4-8 (1964).
9 Comment, Fair Trade: The Ideal and Reality, 27 Ohio St. L.J. 144, 147 (1966).
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ported introduction of fair trade legislation. 10 The small retailers felt that
fair trade would afford some protection against the larger retailers by main-
taining at least minimum resale prices. Fair trade would prevent mass mer-
chandisers from taking full advantage of their economies of size through
lower prices and would end the use of fair-traded products as loss leaders.
Retailers were not alone in their support of fair trade legislation. Manu-
facturers of brand named or trademarked products invest large sums of money
in advertising their products to familiarize the consuming public with their
brand name or trademark. Because of the well known brand name or trade-
mark and because of prices higher than similar competitive products, their
products obtain a reputation of high quality in the eyes of the consumer who
often associates high prices with high quality. 11 This reputation of high qual-
ity in these brand named or trademarked goods is known as the goodwill of
the product.12
 Some manufacturers feared that the low prices of the chain
stores and discount houses injured the goodwill of their products because
they prevented the association of high quality with the usual high prices of
their brand named or trademarked goods. Thus, in order to maintain the
public image of their products, many manufacturers supported the enactment
of fair trade legislation.
In the early 1930's some states enacted legislation to protect the small
retailers and the goodwill of the manufacturer's products from the conse-
quences of the Iow prices of the chain stores and discount houses." These
statutes allowed fair trading of products—resale price maintenance. Although
these statutes were held constitutional under the Federal Constitution, 14 they
proved ineffective because they allowed only contracts that affected prices in
intrastate transactions." Since most products traveled in interstate commerce,
most brand named and trademarked products could not be fair-traded.
This shortcoming of the state fair trade acts was removed in 1937 when
Congress passed the Miller-Tydings Amendment to the Sherman Antitrust
Act." The Miller-Tydings Amendment is enabling legislation which exempted
from the prohibition of the Sherman Act fair trade contracts for brand named
or trademarked products in interstate transactions.' 7 There was strong oppo-
sition to Miller-Tydings. Some opponents argued that resale price mainte-
nance or fair trading of products is antithetical to the purpose of the Sherman
10 Id. at 147-48; 81 Cong. Rec. 7495 (1937) (remarks of Senator Tydings).
11 Comment, supra note 9, at 153-54.
12 See Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 193-95
(1936).
13 In 1931 California enacted the first fair trade law. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16902
(West 1964).
14 Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936).
15 Cf. S. Rep. No. 2053, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
10 50 Stat. 693 (1937), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
17 The Miller-Tydings Amendment states that contracts establishing resale prices
which affect interstate commerce are legal if such contracts
are lawful as applied to intrastate transactions, under any statute, law, or public
policy now or hereafter in effect in any State, Territory, or the District of Colum-
bia in which such resale is to be made, or to which the [fair traded] commodity
is to be transported for such resale. . • .
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
394
CUSTOMER RESTRICTIONS
Act to foster a free economy with unrestricted competition. 18 Another argu-
ment against resale price maintenance was that it deprived the purchasing
distributor or retailer of the right to alienate freely or sell his property. 19
Proponents of the Amendment countered these criticisms by arguing that, be-
cause Miller-Tydings only allowed the fair trading of trademarked or brand
named products against which similar products were in competition, there
would still be ample competition from competing brands to maintain a free,
competitive economy.20
 Also, it was argued that small retailers were a vital
part of the economic system who must be protected from competition of chain
stores and discount houses in order to survive.21 Finally, it was argued that
the right to free alienation of property was not violated. The goodwill of the
product obtained through the identification of the high-priced trademarked or
brand named product with quality was considered an important right of the
manufacturer in the product, a right worthy of protection although the manu-
facturer had sold all other interest in the product. 22
Until 1951 the Miller-Tydings Amendment was sufficient to allow sub-
stantial fair trading of products. Then, the Supreme Court in Schwegmann
Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp. held that non-signers of fair trade contracts
were not bound by the fair trade contracts of others where the brand named
or trademarked products traveled in interstate commerce despite state
statutes to the contrary. 23 This decision destroyed the effectiveness of resale
price maintenance established by the Miller-Tydings Amendment. Most
retailers would refuse to sign a fair trade contract where they knew that a
competitor who did not sign a fair trade contract could obtain and resell the
products at lower prices. The risk of being undersold by non-signers prevented
any comprehensive fair trade system. Moreover, a non-signing retailer by sell-
ing the product at low prices could defeat the purposes of the fair trade acts,
protection of the small retailer and of the goodwill of the product.
To revitalize fair trade, Congress enacted the McGuire Act in 1952. 24
The Act permits the enforcement of fair trade contracts for interstate goods
against non-signers who had notice of such contracts in those states which
held non-signers bound by fair trade contracts. 21 For no apparent reason, the
18 H. Toulmin, Anti-Trust Laws § 9.2 {1949).
19
 See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 404 (1911).
20 S. Rep. No. 2053, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
21 H.R. 1516, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-14 (1952). This report was given prior to the
passage of the McGuire Act, but it gives the reasons for resale price maintenance.
22 See Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 193-95
(1936).
23 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
24 66 Stat. 631 (1952), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
25 Nothing contained in this section or in any of the Antitrust Acts shall render
unlawful the exercise or the enforcement of any right or right of action created
by any statute, law, or public policy now or hereafter in effect in any State,
Territory, or the District of Columbia, which in substance provides that willfully
and knowingly advertising, offering for sale, or selling any commodity at less than
the price or prices prescribed in such contracts or agreements whether the person
so advertising, offering for sale or selling is or is not a party to such a contract
or agreement, is unfair competition and is actionable at the suit of any person
damaged thereby.
15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (3) (1964).
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McGuire Act also re-enacted the provisions of the Miller-Tydings Amend-
ment with a few additions20
 One of these additions allows fair trade con-
tracts to require a purchaser to enter into fair trade contracts with his own
vendee.27
 This latter addition is an aid to establishing fair trade in states
which do not enact non-signer legislation, since it allows a manufacturer to
insure that his distributors sell only to retailers who have agreed not to sell
below the manufacturer's fixed prices.
II. VERTICAL CUSTOMER RESTRICTIONS
A customer restriction is a restriction limiting the persons to whom a
seller may resell his product.28
 Where the customer restriction exists between
parties who are on a different level of distribution and who are not in com-
petition with each other, the limitation is considered a vertical customer
restriction 29 For example, a vertical customer restriction is imposed if a
manufacturer limits the persons to whom his wholesalers or retailers may
resell his products. Until recently the legality of vertical customer restrictions
was tested under the "rule of reason"3° and they were generally upheld unless
they were ancillary to an illegal price-fixing scheme- or unless the price fixing
was an integral part of the distribution system in which they were present."
Since the decision in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,33 the standard of
reasonableness no longer appears to be the appropriate test for the legality of
vertical customer restrictions.
In Schwinn, the manufacturer sold its products to distributors, all of
whom had agreed to resell only to retailers who had been approved by the
manufacturer. In turn, the retailers were permitted to sell only to consumers
and not to other retailers. Schwinn also executed fair trade contracts with its
retailers where such contracts were permitted and it suggested retail prices
for its bicycles in non-fair-trade states. Thus both the distributors and the
franchised retailers were limited by vertical customer restrictions and some
retailers were further restricted by fair trade prices. 34 The United States
brought suit in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois alleging
that Schwinn and its distributors were involved in a conspiracy to fix prices
and to confine distribution of Schwinn's products to certain dealers in viola-
tion of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The district court found that
there was no basis in fact for the charge of price fixing and, upon application
29
 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2), ( 5 ) (1964).
27
 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2) (1964).
28 See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) ; United
States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
29
 E.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
30 White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
31 Id. at 260.
32
 United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
33 388 U.S, 365 (1967).
34 Schwinn also restricted the territories in which the purchasing distributors could
resell the bicycles. Another aspect of Schwinn's distribution method at issue in the district
court was the practice of limiting the territories and customers of distributors who did not
purchase the bicycles, but who distributed them as an agent of Schwinn or on consign-
ment. 237 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
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of the rule of reason, that the customer restrictions were not iIlega1. 33 On
direct appeal to the Supreme Court, the Justice Department did not contest
the finding that there was no basis for the charge of price fixing but sought
review of the finding that Schwinn's customer restrictions were reasonable.
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court and held that it was a per se
violation of the Sherman Act for a manufacturer to limit the customers to
whom the purchaser of his products could resell." In holding these vertical
customer restrictions illegal the Court used broad language:
Once the manufacturer has parted with title and risk, he has parted
with dominion over the product, and his effort thereafter to restrict
... persons to whom the product may be transferred—whether by
explicit agreement or by silent combination or understanding with
his vendee---is a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. 37
III, CUSTOMER RESTRICTIONS IN FAIR TRADE CONTRACTS
To establish a comprehensive fair trade program in states where there is
no non-signer legislation, a manufacturer must prevent retailers who are not
bound by his resale prices from obtaining his products. He can accomplish
this objective either by requiring the wholesaler to sell only to the retailers
who are bound to follow the resale prices or by bypassing the distributor
and selling directly to the retailer. Since the latter alternative is usually im-
practical, vertical customer restrictions are often the only means by which
manufacturers can institute effective fair trading in states without non-signer
legislation.
The McGuire Act specifically allows one kind of vertical customer restric-
tion: the manufacturer may require the wholesaler to sell only to the retailers
who sign fair trade contracts with the wholesaler. However, many manufac-
turers apparently desire more direct control than this kind of restriction offers.
Rather than leave to the discretion of the wholesaler the choice of which re-
tailers are to be offered fair trade contracts, these manufacturers prefer to
impose customer restrictions on their wholesalers which would allow them to
sell only to retailers approved directly by the manufacturer. These "manufac-
turer-retailer" restrictions require the wholesaler to sell only to retailers who
have signed fair trade contracts with the manufacturer.
Although the sweep of Schwinn's prohibition seems to be so broad that it
makes all customer restrictions illegal wherever they appear, the decision in
35 The district court held also that the territorial restrictions on the purchasing
distributors were illegal per se under the Sherman Act, but that the customer and ter-
ritorial restrictions on the distributors who handled the bicycles as agents or on con-
signment were not illegal under the Sherman Act. Id.
38 The Supreme Court held also that it was a per se violation for a manufacturer
to limit the territories in which the purchaser of his product may resell. But the Court
held that where the distributors did not receive title, dominion and the risk of loss from
the manufacturer and handled the bicycles as agents or salesmen of the manufacturer,
the customer and territorial restrictions upon these distributors were not illegal upon
the application of the "rule of reason." 388 U.S. at 379-82. For a discussion of the
Supreme Court decision in Schwinn see Comment, Restricted Distribution After "Schwinn,"
9 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 1032 (1968).
87 388 U.S. at 382.
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Schwinn did not resolve the issue whether certain customer restrictions are
legal when present in fair trade contracts. There was fair trading of products
in Schwinn, but the customer restrictions there were not linked closely to
the fair trade program. The manufacturer did not attempt to justify them as
necessary features of their fair trade program and imposed them even where
fair trading was not allowed.
In Schwinn, therefore, the Court was not called upon to decide the nar-
row issue of the legality of customer restrictions which are ancillary to a fair
trade program. Moreover, the McGuire Act specifically allows fair trade con-
tracts with vertical customer restrictions which require the wholesaler to sell
only to retailers who have signed fair trade contracts with the wholesaler."
These restrictions are clearly exempted from Schwinn's broad prohibition of
vertical customer restrictions because the McGuire Act exempts fair trade
contracts with these specific restrictions from all antitrust laws. 3°
It is less clear, however, whether customer restrictions which require the
wholesalers to sell only to retailers who have signed fair trade contracts with
the manufacturer are immune from Schwinn's rule of per se illegality when
they are present in fair trade contracts. This restriction is not expressly per-
mitted in fair trade contracts by the McGuire Act, but it is similar in wording
and, at least superficially, in effect to the restriction permitted by the McGuire
Act. The legality of the customer restriction at issue depends upon whether
the federal fair trade statutes impliedly permit fair trade contracts with such
restrictions. If the contracts with such restrictions are not permitted by the
Miller-Tydings Amendment or the McGuire Act both the contracts and the
customer restrictions therein lose their immunity from the antitrust laws.
Unless the restriction at issue is exempted from the antitrust laws by Miller-
Tydings or McGuire, they are probably illegal under Schwinn's broad prohibi-
tion.
A. The Arguments for the Manufacturer-Retailer Restriction
There are two arguments for the position that fair trade contracts with
the manufacturer-retailer restriction are permitted by the federal fair trade
statutes. The first argument is that the language of the fair trade statutes im-
pliedly allows them. This interpretation rests upon two cases which were
decided immediately subsequent to the passage of the McGuire Act and upon
the apparently identical effect of the manufacturer-retailer restriction and
the restriction explicitly allowed by the McGuire Act. The second argument is
that fair trade contracts with these restrictions are permitted by the fair
trade statutes because the restriction is a necessary ancillary restriction to an
effective fair trade program and because without such a restriction the im-
plementation and maintenance of a fair trade program would not be possible.
Neither argument is sufficient to establish that fair trade contracts with
38 The McGuire Act specifically allows fair trade contracts that require "a vendee
to enter into [fair tradel contracts.. .." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1964). This phrase may
be interpreted as requiring the wholesaler to sign fair trade contracts with retailers or,
in other words, as requiring the wholesaler to sell only to retailers who have signed fair
trade contracts with the wholesaler.
39 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1964).
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the restriction at issue are permitted by the Miller-Tydings Amendment or the
McGuire Act. The first argument fails because the two cases relied upon did
not apply the strict interpretation always used in the construction of the fair
trade statutes. Also, there is one important distinction between the effect of
the manufacturer-retailer restriction and the effect of the restriction permitted
by the McGuire Act. The former restriction allows the manufacturer to
violate an important antitrust policy reinforced in Schwinn, the freedom of
the trader, specifically the freedom of the wholesaler to choose his own cus-
tomers. The second argument fails not only because the manufacturer-retailer
restriction is not always necessary for the implementation of a fair trade
program, but also because it may be a means by which the purposes of the
fair trade statutes are defeated. Thus, it is submitted, fair trade contracts
which require the wholesaler to sell only to retailers who have signed fair
trade contracts with the manufacturer are not permitted by the Miller-
Tydings Amendment or the McGuire Act and they are illegal under the
Sherman Act.
The argument that the Miller-Tydings Amendment and the McGuire
Act can be interpreted as permitting fair trade contracts with the manufac-
turer-retailer restriction is grounded partly upon two cases, Masters, Inc. v.
Sunbeam Corp." and Sunbeam Carp. v. Payless Drug Stares. 4 ' Both cases
were concerned with the legality of Sunbeam's wholesale fair trade contracts
under the Miller-Tydings Amendment. These contracts contained the
manufacturer-retailer restriction. The contracts required the wholesaler to
sell Sunbeam's products only to retailers who had signed fair trade contracts
with Sunbeam, the manufacturer. In Masters, the court held that, because the
fair trade contracts placed another condition upon .the resale of products in
addition to the minimum resale prices, they were not permitted by the Miller-
Tydings Amendment. 42 The court interpreted the Amendment to allow only
contracts which placed the single condition of minimum prices upon the resale
of the products. 43 In Payless, the court held that the Miller-Tydings Amend-
ment permitted fair trade contracts with Sunbeam's restriction because the
contracts fell within the Amendment's phrase which made lawful contracts
prescribing minimum resale prices. 44 The contracts were viewed as prescrib-
ing in essence two minimum resale prices, one wholesale and one retail.45
In both cases, the Miller-Tydings Amendment governed the legality of
the contracts, but the courts consulted the McGuire Act as an aid to its inter-
pretation of Miller-Tydings. In both cases, the McGuire Act was interpreted
to permit Sunbeam's resale price maintenance contracts with the restriction
requiring the wholesaler to sell only to retailers who had signed fair trade con-
tracts with the manufacturer." The two courts placed different significance
upon the fact that the McGuire Act contained other additions to the Miller-
4 ° 112 F. Supp. 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
41 113 F. Supp. 31 (N.D. Cal. 1953).
42 112 F. Supp, at 270-71.
45 Id. at 270-72.
44 113 F. Supp. at 38-39.
45 Id. at 39.
4° 113 F. Supp. at 37; 112 F. Supp. at 271. In both cases the McGuire Act was in-
applicable because it was enacted after the initiation of the actions.
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Tydings Amendment beside the provision allowing enforcement of fair trade
contracts against non-signers. In Masters, the court concluded that because
of these other additions the McGuire Act did not merely clarify the protection
afforded by the Miller-Tydings Amendment.' Thus the Act could not be
considered as a basis for declaring the Sunbeam contracts legal under the
Miller-Tydings Amendment. Despite these other additions to the Miller-
Tydings Amendment, the court in Payless considered the McGuire Act as a
mere restatement of what the Amendment stated less explicitly." Thus the
court in Payless held that the Sunbeam fair trade contracts with the customer
restriction requiring the wholesaler to sell only to retailers who signed fair
trade contracts with Sunbeam were permitted by the Miller-Tydings Amend-
ment because they were allowed by the McGuire Act, the statutory clarifica-
tion of the Amendment."
The conclusion of Payless concerning the, Miller-Tydings Amendment
and the conclusion of both cases concerning the McGuire Act were based on
a liberal interpretation of the fair trade statutes. But the Supreme Court has
consistently applied a strict interpretation to these statutes. For example, in
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 5° the Supreme Court applied a
strict construction of the Miller-Tydings Amendment and held that the
Amendment permitted no enforcement of fair trade contracts against non-
signers. The Court here gave the words of the Amendment their normal and
customary meaning 51 and refused to read the non-signer provision into the
statute although the destructive effect of the decision on resale price main-
tenance was obvious prior to the decision. 52 Similarly in United States v.
McKesson & Robbins, Inc.° the Supreme Court applied a strict interpreta-
tion of the Miller-Tydings Amendment and the McGuire Act. There the Court
explicitly stated that the resale price maintenance exemption of antitrust acts
is to be construed strictly because it "is a privilege restrictive of a free econ-
omy."54
 In other instances the courts have similarly refused to give the fair
trade acts a loose or liberal interpretation. 55
When the Miller-Tydings Amendment is strictly interpreted, it must be
concluded that the statute does not permit customer restrictions which require
the wholesaler to sell only to retailers who have signed fair trade contracts
with the manufacturer. There are no words in the statute whose ordinary and
customary meaning could possibly lead to a contrary conclusion.
A strict interpretation of the McGuire Act would produce the same result.
The McGuire Act specifically allows fair trade contracts which require "a
47 112 F. Supp. at 271.
48 113 F. Supp. at 39-40.
42 Id.
50 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
51 Id. at 388.
52 Cf. id. at 397 (dissenting opinion).
53
 351 U.S. 305 (1956).
54 Id. at 316.
55 E.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. FTC, 158 F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied,
330 U.S. 823 (1947), where the court, in refusing to interpret that a manufacturer's
camera film which produced color photographs was in "free and open competition" with
non-color film, stated that the Miller-Tydings Amendment should not be interpreted
so broadly as to defeat its purpose. Id. at 594.
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vendee to enter into contracts or agreements prescribing minimum or stipu-
lated prices. . . ."56 This phrase may be interpreted as permitting the manu-
facturer to require his wholesaler to sell only to retailers who sign fair trade
contracts with the wholesaler. It is admitted that this phrase may also be in-
terpreted to allow fair trade contracts requiring the wholesaler to sell only
to retailers who have signed fair trade contracts with the manufacturer. The
latter interpretation is broader than the former because it would permit more
exempted activity. It would allow the manufacturer to take vital and active
part in the selection of the wholesaler's customers after the manufacturer had
apparently sold all of his interest in the product. A court recognizing that the
fair trade acts give a limited immunity from the antitrust laws" and applying
a strict interpretation would not adopt the interpretation which allows a
broader exemption. Rather it would interpret the McGuire Act to permit only
contracts which require the wholesaler to sell only to retailers who have signed
a fair trade contract with the wholesaler.
B. The Freedom of Me Trader
Neither can the McGuire Act be interpreted to permit the manufacturer-
retailer restriction for the second reason advanced for that construction—that
because the effects of this restriction and the effects of the restriction ex-
pressly permitted by the McGuire Act are substantially the same, the McGuire
Act also permits contracts with the manufacturer-retailer restriction. The
effect of both restrictions is that the wholesaler is not contractually free to
sell to a retailer unless the retailer is a party to a fair trade contract. There is
a difference, however. Under the McGuire Act restriction, the retailer would
contract with the wholesaler, whereas under the manufacturer-retailer restric-
tion, the retailer would contract with the manufacturer. In practice this dis-
tinction is very significant. Under the latter restriction the manufacturer
chooses the wholesaler's customers by signing fair trade contracts with cer-
tain retailers. The wholesaler's freedom to trade, specifically his freedom to
choose his own customers, is restricted in contravention of the antitrust policy
to protect the freedom of the trader. Therefore an interpretation of the
McGuire Act as permitting the manufacturer-retailer restriction should not
be accepted.
Under the restriction permitted by the McGuire Act all retailers are
potential customers of the wholesaler. In relation to the wholesaler all retailers
stand on the same footing. To obtain the manufacturer's products they must
sign a fair trade contract: with the wholesaler. Under the manufacturer-retailer
restriction, not all of the retailers are potential customers of the wholesaler. In
practice, only the retailers who have signed fair trade contracts with the manu-
facturer are potential customers unless the wholesaler wishes to breach his con-
tract with the manufacturer and sell to non-contracting retailers. Thus the
manufacturer chooses the wholesaler's customers by signing fair trade contracts
with certain retailers and the freedom of the wholesaler to choose his customers
is greatly curtailed.
The freedom of the trader has long been an important antitrust policy.
56 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1964).
57 Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 388 (1951).
491
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
This policy is an essential aspect of the Sherman Act, the purpose of which
was to keep trade free from restraint. 58
 The freedom of the individual trader
was expressly protected first in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park &
Sons Co., where the Supreme Court held that it was illegal per se under the
Sherman Act for the manufacturer to establish the resale prices at which his
retailers may resell his products. 59
 This protection still exists except for the
limited exception created by the fair trade statutes. Also, the individual trader
has been protected against horizontal boycotts which prevent him from obtain-
ing products.°° And in Schwinn the Supreme Court held that the individual
trader may not have his selling territories or his choice of customers restricted
by the manufacturer.01
 Thus, the freedom of the individual trader has been
protected under the antitrust laws and the merchant's freedom to choose his
customers has specifically been protected in Schwinn.
Because the manufacturer-retailer restriction enables the manufacturer to
select which retailers may sell his products, the restriction limits the freedom
of the wholesaler to choose his own customers. The restriction explicitly per-
mitted by the McGuire Act produces a similar effect in that the wholesaler's
final choice of customers is limited to retailers who are bound by the resale
prices, but it does not deprive the wholesaler of his freedom to choose his own
customers from all the retailers. Because the fair trade statutes allow restric-
tion upon the freedom of the trader to establish his own prices and do not
mention any other restriction upon the trader's freedom, except for the rela-
tively minor limitation caused by the customer restriction permitted ex-
pressly by the McGuire Act, it is unreasonable to conclude that the fair trade
statutes, specifically the McGuire Act, would allow contracts imposing the
manufacturer-retailer restriction. Such contracts would limit the freedom of
the trader to fix his own prices and to choose his own customers and were not
sanctioned by the fair trade statutes.
Thus, a strict interpretation of the Miller-Tydings Amendment and the
McGuire Act precludes the conclusion that fair trade contracts containing the
manufacturer-retailer restriction are permitted by the fair trade statutes.
Also, the policy of protecting the freedom of the trader, specifically his free-
dom to choose his own customers, weighs against an interpretation of the
McGuire Act as permitting fair trade contracts with the manufacturer-
retailer restriction, because contracts with this restriction would limit the
wholesaler's freedom far more severely than was intended by fair trade stat-
utes. Therefore, the fair trade statutes cannot be interpreted as authorizing
fair trade contracts with a restriction requiring the wholesaler to sell only to
retailers who sign fair trade contracts with the manufacturer.
C. The Necessary Ancillary Restraint Argument
Finally, the argument that the manufacturer-retailer restriction is a
necessary ancillary restriction to a fair trade program and thus is impliedly
58 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
59
 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
co E.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
of 388 U.S. at 382.
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permitted by the fair trade statutes is unacceptable. This argument fails to
consider the fact that the restriction explicitly permitted by the McGuire
Act provides the same protection as the manufacturer-retailer restriction and,
furthermore, that it prevents the manufacturer from pursuing other practices
not envisioned by the fair trade statutes, such as arbitrary exclusion of re-
tailers by the manufacturer.
In states with fair trade statutes that do not contain a non-signer clause,
it can be argued that the restriction at issue in a fair trade contract is neces-
sary for the establishment of a fair trade program. If fair trade contracts with
this restriction were not permitted in these states, distributors would be able
to sell to retailers who failed to sign such contracts with the manufacturer.
These retailers would not be bound directly by contract with the manufacturer
or indirectly because of a non-signer clause. Thus they would be able to sell
the products at any price and thereby defeat the goals of the fair trade
statutes. Furthermore, in states without non-signer clauses the manufacturers
could probably not initiate a fair trade program at all. No retailer would sign
a fair trade contract with the knowledge that his competitors could obtain the
goods and sell them below the minimum prices to which he would be bound.
Also it can be argued that the customer restriction at issue is necessary
to enable the manufacturer to police and enforce his fair trade program, espe-
cially in states with fair trade statutes that contain a non-signer clause. As
a condition for continuing its fair trade program a manufacturer is required
to police and enforce its program. 62
 In states with non-signer legislation if a
manufacturer cannot require his wholesalers to resell only to the retailers who
have signed fair trade contracts with him, some of the manufacturer's products
could be sold to non-contracting retailers whose possession of them would be un-
known to the manufacturer. If these retailers know of the manufacturer's fair
trade program, they are bound to follow the resale prices because of the non-
signer clauses. Yet it is impossible for the manufacturer to police and enforce
his program against these retailers because they are unknown to him. Moreover,
the manufacturer will probably not discover that these retailers possessed his
products until after their low prices bring them notoriety. But by this time the
injury to the goodwill of the product will already have occurred.
It is submitted that neither of these arguments is conclusive, and that
the restriction expressly allowed by the McGuire Act is sufficient to permit
effective fair trading. The manufacturer-retailer restriction makes fair trading
easier, but it is not a necessary ancillary restraint.
The restriction permitted by the McGuire Act will enable a manufac-
turer to establish an effective fair trade program in states without non-signer
legislation. Only retailers who agree to fair trade contracts with the whole-
saler can acquire the manufacturer's products and the contracting retailers
will have no basis to fear that competitors not bound by the resale prices will
obtain the products. Therefore, the manufacturer-retailer restriction is not
necessary to establish a program in states without non-signer clauses, because
62 2 Trade Reg. Rep. 11 6322 (1965).
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the McGuire Act restriction insures an effective fair trade program in these
states.
Furthermore, the only advantage of the manufacturer-retailer restriction
at issue in states which have non-signer legislation is direct notice to the
manufacturer of the retailers who possess his products. This same advantage
would ensue for the manufacturer under the restriction at issue in states with
no non-signer legislation after the fair trade contracts had been signed. This
notice makes policing and enforcing the fair trade program much easier. How-
ever, under the restriction expressly permitted by the McGuire Act the manu-
facturer could easily obtain equivalent notice by requiring the wholesaler to
inform him of the retailers who purchase his products. Thus, the manufacturer-
retailer restriction is not necessary for policing and enforcing a fair trade
program.
The manufacturer-retailer restriction is really necessary only where the
manufacturer desires to protect the goodwill of his product by means in ad-
dition to resale price maintenance. By signing fair trade contracts only with
certain retailers, the manufacturer, through the customer restriction at issue,
can limit his wholesaler's customers to retailers whose possession of the prod-
ucts will enhance the goodwill of his product. For example, the manufac-
turers could sign fair trade contracts only with retailers who have a good
reputation or impressive physical facilities. Thus the manufacturer would be
protecting the goodwill of his products by a customer restriction on his
wholesaler and by established resale prices. The fair trade statutes, however,
have as one of their purposes the protection of the goodwill of the manu-
facturer's products only through the maintenance of resale prices. Also, the
restriction expressly permitted by the McGuire Act is sufficient to protect the
goodwill through maintenance of resale prices because only retailers who
agree with the wholesaler to follow the resale prices, and thereby protect the
goodwill of the product by the means envisioned by the fair trade statutes,
can obtain those products. Therefore, the manufacturer-retailer restriction is
not necessary to protect the goodwill of the manufacturer's product through
the maintenance of resale prices.
Because the manufacturer-retailer restriction is not necessary either to
implement a fair trade program in states with no non-signer legislation, or
to police and enforce a fair trade program or to protect the goodwill of the
manufacturer's products by maintenance of resale prices, the restriction is
not a necessary ancillary restriction to a fair trade program. Therefore the
fair trade statutes should not be considered as permitting contracts with the
customer restriction at issue.
CONCLUSION
It has been shown that the fair trade statutes, the Miller-Tydings
Amendment and the McGuire Act do not allow resale price maintenance
contracts with the customer restriction requiring the wholesaler to sell only
to retailers who have signed fair trade contracts with the manufacturer. As
a result, fair trade contracts which attempt to impose such a restriction lose
their exemption from the antitrust laws. Thus . the establishment of resale
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prices is illegal per se under the Sherman Act because it is non-exempted price
fixing. Finally, under the Schwinn decision the manufacturer-retailer restric-
tions would be illegal per se under the Sherman Act because the restriction
would not fall within the protection of the fair trade exemption.
THOMAS HOWARD BROWN
405
